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Abstract. In God and Necessity Brian Leftow provides an original explanation 
of kinds and essences in terms of freely chosen divine powers, which act as 
(substitutes for) possible worlds. Although I agree that kinds and essences are 
the result of God’s free choice and am impressed by Leftow’s scrupulous attention 
to detail, I shall argue that divine powers fail to do the work that they are meant 
to do. I shall argue this in three stages. First I provide an alternative explanation 
of absolute necessity using the good old analytic/synthetic distinction. Then 
I  argue that if we need possible worlds or substitutes for possible worlds to 
consider counterfactual situations, there are not enough divine powers to 
provide these worlds (or substitutes). Finally I argue that kinds and essences are 
indeed dependent on God’s choice but in a negative fashion, being the result of 
divine self-limitation.1
In God and Necessity Brian Leftow begins with a – to me – convincing 
case that there is a fundamental modality of absolute necessity, and then 
proposes an explanation of secular necessity. He does this by assuming 
that a secular necessity is an absolutely necessary secular truth.
By absolute necessity Leftow means the necessity relative to which 
other necessities are characterised. Suppose, for instance, that there are 
laws of nature that God, in performing miracles, can perhaps break. Let 
their conjunction be k. Then we may say a proposition p is physically 
necessary if not-((not-p) and k) is absolutely necessary. By a  secular 
proposition, Leftow means one that is about non-divine concrete 
entities, those that theists would consider created. It would seem to 
follow that an explanation of the absolute necessity of secular truths is 
an  explanation of secular necessity. I  disagree. For Leftow’s examples 
1 Many thanks to Einar Duenger Bøhn for his useful comments, especially on my 
assimilation of absolute non-contingency to analytic non-contingency.
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of secular necessity, such as that water is H2O, are absolutely necessary 
because water, hydrogen and oxygen are natural kinds. The explanatory 
work is done, I say, by the existence of these kinds, which is not a matter 
of absolute necessity. That is my first point of disagreement with Leftow, 
and the topic of Section One.
As part of his explanation of absolute necessity, Leftow offers us 
(substitutes for) absolutely possible worlds, namely the world-powers as 
he calls them. The idea is that God freely comes to have various powers 
and what God has the power to do is possible, hence, it is said, the 
powers explain the possibilities not vice versa. In Section One I provide 
an  alternative explanation of absolute necessity, one that is neutral 
between theism and atheism.
In Section Two I shall argue that if we need possible worlds there are 
not enough divine powers to act as substitutes for them. That would be 
a problem even if there were no alternative account of absolute necessity, 
such as the one I provide in Section One. Finally, in Section Three, I shall 
sketch an alternative theory of how God brings about kinds and essences.
I. ABSOLUTE NECESSITY
Near the beginning of the book Leftow provides a  convincing case 
for there being a  fundamental modality of necessity no-matter-what 
(pp. 30-38, my hyphens). I interpret this to mean that those truths that 
no human being can bracket off, that is suppose false, are absolutely 
necessary. Hence counterfactual conditionals with antecedents that are 
impossible-no-matter-what are trivial and usually taken to be vacuously 
true. To be sure we can reason about such situations, but only formally. 
For example, Euclid’s famous proof that there is no largest prime number 
begins by inviting us to assume the contrary, multiply all the primes 
and add one. He then shows that this would be a new prime, which is 
absurd. In that, formal fashion, we can reason about the impossible-
no-matter-what.2 But we are unable to reason more generally about the 
counterfactual situation in which there is a largest prime. Or if we can 
it is only because we decide that all such counterfactuals are vacuously 
true. Likewise, we have no trouble assessing ‘If a  married bachelor 
2 In this paper I shall not argue over which, if any, mathematical truths are true no 
matter what. My opinion is that the Axiom of Choice is not such, but the existence of 
an infinity of natural numbers is.
27NOT ENOUGH POWERS
gets married he is a  husband’, but we cannot assess the conditional, 
‘If a married bachelor gets married he does something wrong’, except, 
perhaps, to say it is vacuously true.
We may contrast this with the case of physical necessity. We may 
coherently suppose that classical rather than quantum mechanics is true 
and indeed we do make that coherent supposition in many applications 
of physics.
This idea of what may coherently be supposed, or, equivalently 
I  hope, has a  negation that may be supposed false, explicates the 
traditional notion of an  analytic truth, and I  shall henceforth use the 
term ‘analytic’ for ‘necessary no-matter-what’.3 Now, the truth that there 
are thoughts and hence propositions is not itself analytic, nor need it be 
for the proposed characterization of the analytic to succeed. I mention 
this because Leftow criticizes the assimilation of absolute necessity to 
being analytic  – an  assimilation I  do not quite make  – partly on the 
grounds that it makes the necessity of necessary propositions depend 
on the existence of these propositions (pp.  483-60) which is not itself 
an analytic truth.
This point is made clearer by a consideration of possible worlds. Many 
of these contain no thoughts, but that does not stop us thinking about 
them. In that respect they do not differ from black holes. We can reason 
coherently about them even though they are uninhabitable.
So we should ask why absolute necessity is not just being analytic. The 
answer is because there are analytic truths of the form ‘It is (absolutely) 
non-contingent that p’, where p is not itself analytic. Ontological 
arguments of one sort or another might be taken to establish this for 
p = ‘God exists’. In addition, there are Kripkean necessities of identity 
such as p = ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ or natural kind truths such as p = 
‘water is H2O’. And there are essential truths such as ‘Hesperus is in fact 
an  inanimate material object, not a  goddess’. These last two types of 
absolutely necessary truths are paradigms of secular necessities.
Therefore, I characterize absolute necessity as the narrowest necessity 
satisfying S5 modal logic that includes all analytic truths and that treats 
every truth as absolutely possible. Other less narrow necessities are then 
obtained by considering any set of absolutely possible worlds and any 
accessibility relation between them.
3 I assume closure under a small number of rules whose truth-preserving character 
is itself analytic.
28 PETER FORREST
Secular propositions are those about concrete entities that do 
not presuppose theism. Leftow is offering us a  theory of the absolute 
necessity of some secular propositions such as that water is H2O. I say, 
however, that we do not need a theory of its necessity other than a theory 
of its truth since it is absolutely non-contingent. Moreover Leftow’s 
explanation of necessity is based on the idea that we do not need to 
explain why there are no additional worlds so anything that is true at all 
the posited worlds, or their substitutes the divine powers, is necessarily 
true. But I fail to see how the mere lack of extra worlds explains anything 
unless we can explain that lack in turn, but according to Leftow it is just 
God’s free decision and so not explained.
The Circularity Objection
To define absolute necessity in terms of analytic truths about absolute 
non-contingency would be circular, but that is not my intention. I have 
learnt from Leftow that we have this concept of absolute necessity and 
I then claim that the analytic/synthetic distinction enables us to explain 
truths about absolute necessity in terms of other truths that are not 
modalized. To any who would remind me of W. V. O. Quine’s paper ‘Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism’ my reply is brief, ‘I am not an empiricist’.
A Dilemma for Leftow
I now propose a dilemma. Do we need possible worlds or even substitutes 
for possible worlds except, perhaps, to characterize necessity as truth at 
all possible worlds? If not then we may characterize absolute necessity 
as above and do without the possible worlds. But if we do need them for 
other purposes such as analyzing counterfactual conditionals then, we 
need all absolutely possible worlds not just some of them. For anything 
we may coherently suppose may be the antecedent of a  non-vacuous 
counterfactual conditional.
II. AGAINST DIVINE POWERS AS WORLD-SUBSTITUTES
I now argue that there are not enough divine powers to act as world-
substitutes. I  do so by providing some objections to Leftow’s theory. 
These objections have more weight in the context of the previous section, 
where an alternative account is provided of absolute necessity. They are 
still serious objections even if my reliance on the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is rejected. For they exhibit some unattractive features of 
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Leftow’s account, ones which would be troublesome even if there were 
no better account available of absolute necessity.
Objection One A Version of the Modal Problem of Evil
Here is a version of the modal problem of evil, based on that of Theodore 
Guleserian.4 It uses as a premise the possibility of a world that is at all 
times gratuitously evil, and so such that an all-powerful all-knowing God 
would have terminated before any given time, however far in the past.5 
Such a possibility is inconsistent with the existence of an essentially good, 
all-powerful, God. It follows from the premise that there is no essentially 
all powerful, all knowing and good God that exists necessarily.
Leftow rejects the premise, to which I shall return. I would reject the 
thesis that God is essentially good, holding instead that, like the blessed 
in Heaven, God is good because God has every reason to be good. But 
this might seem rather too radical for perfect being theologians, so I now 
provide an  alternative way of resisting the modal argument from evil 
without denying the premise. I suggest that divine omnipotence is to be 
adjusted as follows. In place of omnipotence there is the perfection of 
being able to do anything you desire to do.6 By itself that perfection does 
not give any powers at all, but combined with divine goodness it ensures 
very many powers, and acts as a substitute for omnipotence. Making this 
modification, it turns out that God has no power to create thoroughly 
evil worlds. This response, however, grants that there are possible worlds 
that God does not have the power to make actual.
My case for the possibility of such gratuitously evil worlds has two 
premises. The first premise is that there is a possible world w in which 
similar evils result from the free choice of creatures. The second premise 
is that whatever a creature can freely bring about, God could cause that 
creature to bring about in a way that is not free, and hence there is a world 
w* rather like w in which God does just that.7
4 See Theodore Guleserian, ‘God and Possible Worlds: The Modal Problem of Evil’, 
Noûs, 17 (1983), 221-238.
5 Leftow points out (p. 120) that his theory is a way of rejecting such premises without 
being ad hoc. That does not affect the objection.
6 Just as an omnipotent God lacks the power to cause a creature to act freely in a certain 
way, I assume the perfection that substitutes for omnipotence would not attribute to God 
such a power, even if God should desire to exercise it.
7 Clearly, the phrase ‘whatever a creature can freely bring about’ must not be taken to 
refer to the creature as the agent or the creature’s freedom.
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To establish the first premise consider, for instance, a possible world w, 
in which there have always been inhabited planets on each of which there 
are humanoids with two by-God-intended first parents, whom we may 
as well call Adam and Eve. In this world, they always sin by freely eating 
the forbidden fruit, and the chemicals in the fruit make them sterile. 
I have it in for them, so I decree that it prevents them from even having 
sex. They die in some discomfort after leading futile sinful childless lives. 
Moreover there is no afterlife. I assume that God can create such a world 
with an infinity of Adams and Eves free to obey or disobey.
Rather than establish the second premise in full generality, it suffices 
to consider again the example of the possible worlds with an infinity of 
culpable Adams and Eves. God could create a world in which they do 
not act freely but are predestined to disobey, provided God decides to 
redeem the world by, among other things, ensuring an afterlife. So for 
any given time t, there is a possible world w*(t) exactly like the putative 
world w* up to t, and such that no good God would create. I now ask at 
what time does w* cease to be possible? The absence of any answer shows 
that w* is possible. Nor can this conclusion be resisted by supposing 
an omega moment after the end of ordinary time. For if that is coherent 
so is the corresponding modification of w in which various Adams and 
Eves go on making the wrong choices after the end of ordinary time.
I conclude that those who want to defend the essential perfection of 
a necessarily existing God should grant the suggested replacement for 
omnipotence and hence concede that w* is a world that is possible but 
God cannot bring about.
It might be objected that God is not so niggardly as to create such 
worlds as w*(t), and so Premise (1) is not secure. If this is just a matter 
of raising the standard for being creation-worthy then I will adjust the 
example. Suppose for instance we allow a  world in which the Adams 
and Eves live futile lives by our standards but, themselves having low 
standards, enjoy themselves immensely eating more and more of the 
forbidden fruit. I  invite readers to consider a  scenario in which these 
low standards are the consequences of their eating the forbidden fruit, 
because the chemicals in it damage their brains. Because they are by 
nature fitted for higher things, w* would still not be good enough to 
create if they were predestined.
In further support of my conclusion that divine perfection requires 
not omnipotence but rather the conjunction of divine goodness with 
being able to do anything you desire, I  note that Leftow’s account 
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trivialises divine omnipotence, because the possibilities are limited to 
the powers God chooses to have. So Leftow already has reason to replace 
traditional omnipotence by my proposed substitute when listing the 
divine perfections.
Objection Two: The ‘It was in God to’ modality
If God freely chose the divine powers, then in some sense God had 
the capacity to acquire different powers from the actual ones. So there 
might have been different world-powers and hence different secular 
possibilities. But, I say, whatever is possibly possible is possible, so it is 
possible for God to have had different powers, contrary to the use of 
divine powers as substitutes for secular possibilities.
Leftow anticipates something like this objection, acknowledging 
Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (p. 253, n.7). His response is that ‘it was in 
God to’ would not be an interesting modality. I disagree: to say that it was 
in God to acquire other powers implies it is consistent with the divine 
nature to acquire these powers and hence that it is possibly possible to 
acquire these powers.
Leftow claims, however, that prior to God’s acquisition of various 
powers many modal propositions had truth value gaps. Leftow considers 
the example of a natural kind, zogs, which God could have but did not 
create. So he would say that the propositions that necessarily all zogs are 
perky and possibly all zogs are perky both have truth-value gaps, being 
neither true nor false. On the contrary I submit that given any type of 
possibility the modality of its not being false that possibly is also a type of 
possibility that is at least as broad. But absolute possibility is the broadest 
type, corresponding to the narrowest type of necessity. So bivalence must 
hold for the absolute possibility: it is either true that possibly p or true 
that not possibly p. Likewise for any type of possibility, possibly possibly 
is a type of possibility as least as broad. Hence for absolute possibility both 
‘Possibly possibly p’ and ‘”Possibly p” has a truth-gap’ imply ‘Possibly p’.
I conclude that it being in God to have zoggenic powers is enough 
to ensure that zogs are possible, because either it is not true that zogs 
are impossible or it is possible that zogs are possible and in either case 
zogs are possible, if we are concerned with absolute possibility. From 
Leftow’s assertion that it was in God to have chosen different powers 
it now follows that not all secular absolute possibilities correspond to 
divine powers.
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I anticipate the objection that Leftow is not committed to absolute 
possibility being maximally broad. To that I have three replies. The first 
is that maximal breadth is implied by his case for absolute modality as 
that in terms of which other modalities are defined by restriction. The 
second is that my account of absolute necessity in terms of analytic 
truths implies that it is maximally broad. The third is that whatever 
the case for possible worlds it should apply to absolute possibility as 
I have characterised it. Assuming we need possible worlds or substitutes 
it follows that there are possible worlds in this broadest sense even if 
this is not what Leftow has in mind. Hence even if there are enough 
world-powers to act as substitutes for all Leftow-absolutely-possible 
worlds there are not enough for all worlds, because we also need Leftow-
absolutely-impossible worlds or substitutes for them.
Objection Three: Additional Natural Kinds and Individual Essences
This objection is similar to the previous one, and as with the previous 
one Leftow anticipates something like it, considering a  William 
Rowe inspired objection that whatever kinds and individual essences 
God brought about, God could have produced more. That would be 
a reductio ad absurdum of divine perfection (pp. 290-298). But it also 
shows there are possibilities in excess of the divine powers, contrary to 
Leftow’s theory. He argues, however, that the lack of zoggenic power is 
not a genuine limitation on God’s power because zog-production would 
not be a power God has by nature but one that it was in God to acquire.
My response to Leftow’s case against zoggenic powers is that (1) 
God is in time and (2) if it is in God initially to come to have various 
powers then presumably it is still in God to have additional powers. If we 
knew more about God we might say that this presumption is overcome, 
but in the absence of that knowledge there is a high probability that it 
is in God to go on acquiring additional powers. Leftow has, however, 
an implicit objection to (2). He says that it is part of the divine nature 
to be powerful and that requires only that God come to have at least 
one world-power. So he would say that we do know enough about God 
to know that quite a limited range of powers would have been enough 
to satisfy the requirement that God be powerful. But this suffers from 
the same difficulty as the account of X’s being omnipotent as X’s having 
all powers consistent with X’s nature. The difficulty is that a  being, 
MacEar, whose nature restricts him to scratching his left ear, would 
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count as omnipotent.8 Likewise Leftow’s implicit rejoinder entails that 
God would count as a  powerful being even if the only divine power 
was to create a  world containing nothing more than a  single creature 
with a momentary pleasant experience. Although we cannot create such 
a  world, we can, I  join with Leftow in believing, do something much 
more momentous, choose not to reject God’s offer of friendship. So the 
power to produce the single momentary pleasurable experience is not 
enough. Nor will it help to require an infinity of divine powers, or even 
too many to form a set. For the power to create universes with N such 
momentary experiences for all cardinal numbers N, although impressive 
in one respect, does not do justice to what is ‘in God’. We have no reason, 
then, to overcome the presumption that it is always in God to acquire 
additional powers.
As for (1), Leftow argues that it is absurd to think of God waiting and 
then creating new kinds by coming to have new powers. For, he says, 
whatever reason God had to produce new kinds, God would already 
have had that reason initially. One response might be that God has 
much to do and so the divine events themselves form a continuum with 
God arranging the order in some aesthetic way (hyper-music!). A  less 
extravagant hypothesis is that every moment of divine time has a next 
moment. In that case, I say God is in ordinal not metric time, and it is 
not a question of time lapsing but of God’s doing something the very 
next moment.
Ordinal Time
My third objection to Leftow’s theory depends, therefore, on my 
preference for saying that God is in ordinal not metric time, over both 
strict divine eternity and God experiencing time as we do. Ordinal time 
is based on the B series relation; x is before y. I distinguish it from metric 
time based on the ‘D series’ relation: w is before x by more than y is before 
z. The latter is a  topic in physics, which supports its unification with 
the spatial metric in space-time. The former is a topic in metaphysics, 
although physicists may have something to contribute. One important 
difference between divine time and our immersion in metric time is 
that the latter results in the passage of time, which can be explicated 
as the relation between the metric and the ordinal. Assuming that for 
8 I use this example because it is traditional, even though offensive. Apologies to those 
with the surname ‘McEar’ and to the severely disabled.
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every moment of ordinal time there is a next moment, a successor, then 
we may consider the quantity of metric time that lapses between one 
moment of ordinal time and the next. This is the rate of passage of time, 
and is measured in seconds per next. The plausible doctrine that God 
is not passively swept along by time, as we are, supports either divine 
ordinal time or divine eternity. Likewise if God is distinct from, because 
the creator of, the whole physical world including space-time then God 
is not in metric time, but might well be in ordinal time.
Leftow’s theory of absolute necessity is motivated by his adherence to 
the thesis that everything non-divine, not just concrete entities, depends 
on God. So ordinal time depends on God. I invite readers to share my 
intuition that ordinal time is necessarily unending so that when we talk 
of the end of time we are considering ordinal time after the end of metric 
time. Combining this intuition with the dependence of ordinal time 
on God, I reach the conclusion that ordinal time is not a creation and 
hence depends on God in some other way. The only plausible suggestion 
is that ordinal time depends on God because it is the divine nature to 
be in ordinal time, with each divine moment having a  successor. This 
completes the third objection.
Leftow might suggest, by way of rejoinder, that the unending nature 
of ordinal time is just another secular necessity. But this is not a truth that 
holds just for our universe, like a law of nature. For time is unending, we 
intuit, even if the universe comes to an end.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF KINDS AND ESSENCES
Leftow’s examples of secular necessities involve individual essences such 
as ‘Spot is a dog’ and natural kinds, such as ‘Water is H2O’. In Section 
One, I  argued that the absolute necessity of these claims follows from 
non-modal truths together with analytic truths about absolute non-
contingency. So all that is required is a theory of how God ensures there 
are these essences, not other ones, and these natural kinds, not others. 
I shall suppose, then, that God is aware of the plenitude of all absolute 
possibilities characterized in some way that does not yet involve natural 
kinds or individual essences. Then God acts as a sculptor, chipping away 
at the possibility-block, knowing the chips only as might-have-beens. 
The more God sculpts, the more determinate becomes the structure of 
the still possible, with natural kinds resulting. For example, suppose we 
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have various possible quantities: rest mass, charge, and so on. Initially 
there is a continuous variation of all these quantities, but by prohibiting 
any values near but not exactly equal to those of an electron, God brings 
into existence the natural kind, electrons. Likewise if we consider the 
continuum of possible dogs and their lives, there is no precise boundary 
between those that in hindsight we can call Spot-counterparts and Tops-
counterparts. But by prohibiting all but a fairly narrow range of lives, Spot 
and Tops are left as distinct possible dogs, that is, individual essences.
The same procedure holds for whole universes, which have no clear 
separation from each other in the original plenitudinous block of absolute 
possibilities. Our universe is in there as a number of possible ways things 
might turn out but not yet separated from other ways that are no longer 
possible. To use an image of Leibniz’, it is like a statue before it has been 
carved. It is there in the block but not distinct from the rest of the marble.
Another candidate for secular necessity is that possessed by laws of 
nature, to which I assimilate some of the more recherché mathematical 
axioms such as the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis. 
I also assimilate to the laws some truths known a priori as ‘no surface can 
be uniformly red and green’, which Leftow cites as an example of absolute 
necessity (p. 34). Leftow notes that we can explain the laws in terms of 
essences (p. 251). Thus we may say that it is essential to being our kind of 
universe that a certain regularity (that corresponding to the law) holds.9 
Given the above account of individual essences, this is a matter of God’s 
clarifying the counterparts by excluding very many possible worlds in 
which universes rather like ours occur but the regularities do not hold. 
Clearly this gives room for God either to exclude all exceptions or to 
permit some exceptions to ensure scope for miracles later on. I prefer 
the former, but even on the latter, God, by excluding various possible 
universes, engages in a kenotic self-limitation prior to creation, so we 
may say that the divine powers are indeed the result of divine choice, but 
in a negative fashion.
Although not previously showing any enthusiasm for the above 
theory of laws, I have come to appreciate it. For the alternative realist (i.e. 
anti-Humean) theories seem to imply that the same laws as ours hold in 
all actual universes. Some such as the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory 
9 See John Bigelow, Brian Ellis and Caroline Lierse, ‘The World as One of a Kind: 
Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43 
(1992), 371-388.
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that laws are relations between universals seem to imply that they hold 
in all possible universes too.10 (Evan Fales accepts this conclusion.11) 
But even though the details of divine motivation in creation are hard 
even to speculate about, it seems plausible to me that God would not 
be so niggardly as to create either just one universe or just a multiverse 
comprising many universes with the same fundamental laws.
The idea of God-the-sculptor carving away at a  block of absolute 
possibility does not require any ontologically basic possible worlds. For 
the possible worlds may be thought of as constructs out of possibilities in 
much the way that a Whiteheadian theory treats points as constructs out 
of regions.12 Thus the block of possibility is initially endowed just with 
a point-free topological structure. In addition we do not have to follow 
Leibniz in thinking of God as actualizing a pre-existing possible world. 
Instead we may take an act of creation to involve an assignment of cardinal 
numbers to regions in the possibility-block, with ‘possible worlds’ being 
arbitrary assignments, subject to the coherence principle that if region X 
is part of region Y, X cannot be assigned a greater cardinal than Y.
My proposal meets the objections I  raised to Leftow’s theory. The 
Modal Argument from Evil can be dealt with using the thesis that God 
sculpts the plenitudinous possibility-block. The possibilities that would 
make up a world of gratuitous evil are there, but prior to divine action 
they are not yet incorporated into a world distinct from other worlds. 
Either God has the power to carve it but never does, in which case God 
is omnipotent but not essentially good, or God lacks that power while 
nonetheless having the power to bring about whatever is desired. But in 
neither case does the existence of the possibility of the gratuitously evil 
world refute my theory.
The second objection to Leftow’s theory clearly fails to apply to my 
proposal. For the range of absolute possibilities is wholly unconstrained 
10 See Fred Dretske, ‘Laws of Nature’, Philosophy of Science, 44 (1977), 248–68; Michael 
Tooley, ‘The Nature of Laws’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1977), 667–98; and David 
Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
11 Evan Fales, ‘Are Causal Laws Contingent?’, in John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd 
Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
12 For some details see Peter Roeper, ‘Region-Based Topology’, Journal of Philosophical 
Logic, 26 (1997), 251-309. See also my The Necessary Structure of the All-pervading 
Aether: Discrete or Continuous? Simple or Symmetric? (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2012), p. 160, 
where I summarize the ultrafilter construction of points, discussed in greater detail in 
‘Mereotopology without Mereology’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 39 (2010), 229-254.
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in reality and appears constrained to us, only because of the way we 
think.13 So there is no need for further possibilities other than those God 
contemplates.
As for the last objection I  may need to allow that the plenitude of 
absolute possibilities is neutral between the number of copies of each 
possibility. As a consequence, when God sculpts the range of possibilities, 
there is still a copy of the original plenitude that God could work on. 
So God has the power to create essences and natural kinds again and 
again. This would be an  important qualification to the idea of divine 
self-limitation.
Finally I  turn to Leftow’s rejection of Deity theories of absolute 
necessity, namely those that assert the absolute necessity reflects God’s 
nature. He complains that this makes God’s existence depend on the 
truth-makers for necessary truths about creatures (p.  209). I  note, 
therefore, that my proposed alternative to Leftow’s theory is not open 
to this criticism. For the absolute necessities are dependent on (1) the 
analytic truths, and (2) the natural kinds and individual essences that 
God brings into being. That requires a  realm of absolute possibilities 
for God to know, prior to carving it into discrete possible worlds. This 
possibility-block depends on God’s nature, to be sure, but it is prior to 
the existence of individual essences, and can be considered a realm of 
mathematical possibilities. Leftow concedes that God’s nature might 
determine all logic and pure mathematics (p.  154). I  myself would 
restrict this to analytic truths, and such part of logic and mathematics 
that is synthetic would be assimilated by me to the realm of natural kinds 
and essences. But it seems that a  deity theory of absolute possibilities 
prior to the carving into kinds and essences is acceptable. To those who 
would object that this has a pantheistic flavour with the possibility-block 
being the divine body, I agree but see no objection.
13 The Kantian account of the synthetic a priori extends the range of such constraints. 
For this paper it suffices that analytic truths arise from. such constraints. I do not need 
to discuss what other truths there might be that are similarly the results of constraints 
on thought.
